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THE CONSTITUTION AND PERSONAL
AUTONOMY: THE LAWYERING
PERSPECTIVE
ROBERT A. SEDLER*
INTRODUCTION: THE LAWYERING PERSPECTIVE
I am very honored to have been invited to present the Fifth
Annual Krinock Lecture. The topic of the lecture will be "The
Constitution and Personal Autonomy: The Lawyering Perspec-
tive." In the lecture, I will trace the development of the constitu-
tional protection of personal autonomy through the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, going back to the 1920's,1
through Roe v. Wade,2 and ending up with the Court's 1992 abor-
tion decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey.' I will conclude by relating the Court's holding and
statement of the due process doctrine in Casey to the current con-
stitutional challenge to Michigan's ban on "assisted suicide."
I will trace this development of the constitutional protection
of personal autonomy from the perspective of the lawyer who is
litigating these constitutional challenges. The perspective of the
litigating lawyer involves framing particular kinds of constitutional
challenges in light of existing constitutional doctrine and its capac-
ity for extension. Constitutional cases do not just "happen," as one
might think if one were to look only at the cases that have been
decided by the Supreme Court as they appear in constitutional law
casebooks and are discussed in academic commentary. There are
reasons why particular kinds of constitutional cases are brought at
particular times, and more importantly, why particular kinds of
constitutional challenges are asserted on the basis of particular
constitutional provisions rather than on the basis of others. Thus,
this lecture will emphasize the lawyer's role in constitutional litiga-
tion and will examine how the way in which a particular kind of
constitutional question is litigated may shape the ultimate result
* A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh. Professor of Law, Wayne State Uni-
versity. As the introduction indicates, this article is an expanded version of the Fifth Annual
Krinock Lecture that it was my privilege to deliver at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School on
November 23, 1993.
[To preserve the flavor of the original lecture, only minor modifications have been made
by the editors. Ed.]
1. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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and the development of constitutional doctrine.
I am both an academic commentator and a constitutional liti-
gator. Throughout my career, I have combined scholarly research
with constitutional litigation, mostly as a volunteer attorney for
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and I have tried to
bring the lawyering perspective to my writing and teaching. In the
area of constitutional protection of personal autonomy, I litigated
the "Kentucky version" of Roe v. Wade,4 when I was on the law
faculty of the University of Kentucky, as well as the "Kentucky
version" of the "round two abortion litigation," 5 reflected in the
Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth.' In Michigan, I have been one of the attorneys
in the ACLU challenges to the ban on Medicaid funding for abor-
tion7 and the parental consent law.8 I litigated what turned out to
be an inconclusive challenge to the ban on surrogate parenting,9
and I am currently a part of the ACLU legal team challenging
Michigan's ban on "assisted suicide."'10
Because of my litigation involvement in the area of constitu-
tional protection of personal autonomy, my discussion of the devel-
opment of constitutional law in this area will admittedly lack the
purported impartial and dispassionate perspective of the pure legal
scholar. But I believe that there is an existential as well as an ob-
jective component to legal analysis, and that participation and in-
volvement might thus yield insights that detached observation
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Crossen v. Attorney Gen., 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972),
vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
5. Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
6. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
7. Doe v. Department of Social Serv., 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992).
8. Planned Parenthood of Mid-Michigan, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., No. D 91-0571 AZ
(Kalamazoo Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1993).
9. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). The Court of
Appeals held that the surrogate parenting arrangement that we claimed was constitutionally
protected was not prohibited by the then existing statute. The statute was amended during
the course of the litigation, and for various reasons the constitutional challenge was not
pursued subsequently.
10. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., No. 164963 (filed but not decided).
(Since the time of the speech this case has been decided by the court of appeals. See
518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App.), stay denied sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, 519 N.W.2d
890 (Mich.), amended, 519 N.W.2d 898 (Mich.), appeal granted, 521 N.W.2d 4 (Mich. 1994).
Ed.]
In a 2-1 decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the enactment of the law
violated Article 4, section 24 of the Michigan Constitution. However, lining up differently,
the court also held 2-1, that the law did not violate substantive due process. The Michigan
Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on both issues. The case was argued before that
Court on October 4, 1994, and at that time this article went to press, the case is awaiting
decision.
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could not possibly supply." In any event, this lecture will relate
the lawyering perspective to the development of the line of growth
of constitutional doctrine in the area of personal autonomy.I,
Like all other areas of law, constitutional law develops in a
line of growth. The Supreme Court's decisions in prior cases serve
as precedents for the resolution of future cases presenting the same
or similar issues. The doctrine that the Court promulgates in these
cases and the rationale for its decisions are applicable in future
cases, where that doctrine and rationale can be extended or lim-
ited. The meaning of a constitutional provision thus develops in-
crementally over a period of time, and the line of growth of that
constitutional provision strongly influences its application in par-
ticular cases.'8
For the litigating lawyer, the "stuff of constitutional litigation"
is the Supreme Court's precedents and the constitutional doctrine
that has been promulgated by the Court in prior cases. In deciding
whether or not to assert a constitutional challenge to a particular
law or governmental action, and in deciding on the basis of that
challenge, the lawyer must look to the precedents and doctrine.
This examination of precedents and doctrine will determine the vi-
ability of a particular constitutional challenge and the basis on
which that challenge should be made. Any limitation on govern-
mental power designed to protect individual rights, such as those
associated with personal autonomy, must be found in the text or
internal inferences of the Constitution, and the lawyer must make
a decision as to which constitutional provision or provisions the
11. I have previously approached legal questions from the dual perspectives of an aca-
demic commentator and a litigating lawyer. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitution-
ality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech:" The View from Without and Within, 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 631 (1992); Robert A. Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution:
The View From Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1976); Robert A. Sedler, Metro-
politan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken - On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small
Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1975); Robert A. Sedler, The
Procedural Defense in Selective Service Prosecutions: The View from Without and Within,
56 IOWA L. REV. 1121 (1971).
12. It is especially appropriate that this lecture analyzing constitutional protection of
personal autonomy from the lawyering perspective be presented at the Thomas M. Cooley
Law School. This law school, unlike most any other, approaches legal education from the
lawyering perspective and attempts to integrate the development of lawyering skills into the
law school curriculum. The curriculum of this law school "focuse[s] as much on practical
application of the law as academic mastery," and like the English Inns of Court, the law
school is designed to "function as an educational arm of the legal profession." Its stated
mission "is to prepare its students for entry into the legal profession through an integrated
program with practical legal scholarship as its guiding principle and focus." THOMAS M.
COOLEY LAW SCHOOL CATALOG 6 (1994).
13. See generally Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1033, 1054 (1981) (discussing the development of constitutional doctrine in a line of growth).
See also Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An As-
sessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 118-20 (1983).
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lawyer will rely upon in asserting the particular challenge. Some-
times, the challenge may be asserted on a number of constitutional
grounds, sometimes only on one.
The objective of a lawyer in a constitutional case is to win the
particular case. In constitutional litigation, as in professional foot-
ball, the lawyer may take guidance from the oft-quoted words of
famous Green Bay Packers' coach Vince Lombardi: "Winning isn't
everything; it's the only thing." Since the lawyer's objective is to
win the particular case and not to "make" constitutional law that
will cover an array of future cases that have not yet arisen and may
never arise, the lawyer should keep in mind the principle of consti-
tutional adjudication that the Court will not decide a case "in
broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the
ruling is to be applied.""' The lawyer's objective then is to invali-
date the particular law or governmental action that is being chal-
lenged, and to leave for another day any challenge to a new law or
governmental action that may be enacted or taken in response to
that invalidation.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
PERSONAL AUTONOMY
With this introduction, let us now trace the development of
constitutional protection of personal autonomy from the lawyer's
perspective. We begin with two cases from the 1920's, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 5 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.6 In 1919, in the wake
of the anti-German hysteria of World War I, Nebraska passed a
law prohibiting the teaching of schoolchildren in any language
other than English and the teaching of any foreign language at all
to elementary schoolchildren. The law was directed at the teaching
of German in the Lutheran parochial schools. Meyer, a teacher in a
Lutheran parochial school, was prosecuted under the law for teach-
ing the children in German. Put yourself in the place of Meyer's
lawyer contemplating a constitutional challenge to the law. It is
obvious today that this law violates the First Amendment. The
problem for you as Meyer's lawyer, however, is that in 1919, there
was no First Amendment law for you to use. The Court had not
yet held that the First Amendment was incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, so as to be binding
on the states,' 7 and in any event, in the few World War I cases
14. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947).
15. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
16. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
17. In Gitlow v. New York, the Court assumed for the first time that the First Amend-
ment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 268 U.S. 652,
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asserting First Amendment challenges to the "sedition-type" pros-
ecutions against opponents of the war, the First Amendment chal-
lenge had been singularly unsuccessful.18 So, you are not going to
use the First Amendment.
When you look to Supreme Court precedents and doctrine,
what is it that you see? The answer is that you see Lochner,9 and
the line of cases where the Court used substantive due process to
invalidate federal and state economic regulation.20 We generally
are very critical of the Court for its use of substantive due process
in the Lochner era to protect the so-called "economic freedom" of
business enterprises, and are pleased that the Court has now com-
pletely repudiated its Lochner era use of substantive due process
for this purpose. What is sometimes forgotten, however, is that
during the Lochner era the Court was also using substantive due
process as the textual basis for invalidating governmental action
interfering with personal autonomy. During this time, there was an
all-inclusive theory holding that all liberties, personal as well as
economic, were inviolable.22 Thus, Meyer's lawyer argued that the
ban on teaching a foreign language to schoolchildren was violative
of substantive due process, and the Court agreed. In a ringing
opinion by Justice McReynolds - who is not exactly a favorite of
liberal commentators - the Court gave a broad definition to the
meaning of "liberty," which encompassed personal as well as eco-
nomic freedom. As Justice McReynolds explained:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience and generally to enjoy
666 (1925).
18. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919).
19. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20. See, e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (banning private employment
agencies from accepting fees from workers placed by the agencies); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915) (forbidding discrimination by employers for union activity); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (forbidding discrimination by employers for union activity and
also forbidding employers from requiring employees to sign "yellow dog" agreements not to
join a union).
21. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a regulation of retail milk
prices). See the discussion in Ferguson v. Skrupa, where the Court, in rejecting a due pro-
cess challenge to a law that prohibited all but lawyers from engaging in the business of debt
adjusting, stated: "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to
legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.... The doctrine
that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns and like cases ... has long since been
discarded." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963).
22. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77
MIcH. L. REV. 981, 1029-30 (1979).
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those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.23
Under this definition of liberty, the right of Meyer to teach Ger-
man and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their
children "are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment."24 Since none of the interests that the state asserted were
found to be a legitimate restriction on this liberty, the law was
held to violate the liberty rights of the teacher and the parents. 5
In 1922, the Oregon polity adopted an initiative law requiring
all parents to enroll their children only in public schools. This law
was challenged by private and parochial schools. Today, this law
would be held to violate the First Amendment's guarantees of free-
dom of speech and association, and as regards the prohibition of
attendance at parochial schools, the First Amendment's guarantee
of free exercise of religion as well. But this was 1922, and the First
Amendment had not yet been held to apply to the states. So, there
was no First Amendment that the lawyers for the private and pa-
rochial schools could use to challenge this law.2'6 But there was the
precedent of Meyer v. Nebraska. In the first place, Meyer had held
that the teacher could assert the constitutional rights of the par-
ents who wanted to have their children taught a foreign language .2
Thus, under the authority of Meyer, the schools could assert the
constitutional rights of the parents who wanted to have their chil-
dren taught in private and parochial schools. And likewise, under
the authority of Meyer, the law was violative of substantive due
process, because, it "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."2 8 As Justice McReynolds, again writ-
ing for the Court, went on to say: "The child is not the mere crea-
ture of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations." ' s
In Griswold v. Connecticut,"0 which we shall discuss subse-
quently, Justice Douglas, who strongly objected to the use of sub-
stantive due process as the doctrinal basis for the constitutional
protection of personal autonomy, tried to explain Pierce and
Meyer as First Amendment cases, but they were not decided as
23. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
24. Id. at 400.
25. Id. at 401-03.
26. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
27. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
28. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
29. Id. at 535.
30. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
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First Amendment cases; they were decided as substantive due pro-
cess cases. They are cases that are about parenting, cases that rec-
ognize the right to parent as a fundamental right, and that affirm
the right of parents to "direct and control the upbringing of their
children."
With these cases as precedents, I now want to explore further
the meaning of the constitutional right to parent. The status of
parent belongs to those who have gestated a child, and the biologi-
cal father of a child born out of marriage, once he is identified,
likewise has rights and obligations with respect to the child that he
has gestated.3 ' Once parental rights have come into being, they can
only be terminated by clear and convincing evidence of parental
unfitness.3 2 When parental rights have been terminated under this
exacting standard, however, the parent becomes a legal stranger to
the child, and the child can be adopted by new parents, who then
have the full panoply of parental rights and obligations. As a con-
stitutional matter, as Meyer and Pierce make clear, the right to
parent includes the right to custody and control over the child. A
child can be removed from the parents' custody by the state only
for abuse or neglect, and must be returned whenever it is estab-
lished that the parents will no longer be abusive or neglectful.
Today, we are hearing a lot about children's rights. However,
whenever the state acts to give children rights against their par-
ents, the state is constrained by the constitutional guarantee of
parents' rights. The state may authorize a child to bring a termina-
tion of parental rights action against the child's parents by a next
friend. This is the meaning of a suit by a child to "divorce the
parents." The parents' rights are adequately protected by the con-
stitutional requirement that their parental rights can only be ter-
minated upon clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness.
What the state cannot constitutionally do, however, is to remove a
child from the custody of parents, who have not been determined
to be unfit by clear and convincing evidence, on the ground that a
judge concludes that the "best interests of the child" will be served
by giving someone else custody.33
31. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972).
32. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
33. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (Baby Jessica
case) (holding that the Michigan court must recognize the decree of the Iowa court which
denied the petition for adoption of the child and ordered the return of child to biological
father). It was argued that the "best interests of the child" would be served by giving cus-
tody to the DeBoers, the Michigan couple who had sought to adopt the child and who had
temporary custody of the child for over two years, instead of to Dan Schmidt, her biological
father. Michigan courts, of course, are bound to recognize decrees from Iowa courts under
the full faith and credit clause. But what about the Iowa court? The answer is that the Iowa
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The point is that under Meyer and Pierce, the right to parent
includes the right to custody and control of the child. So long as
parental rights have not been terminated on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence of parental unfitness, the child cannot be re-
moved from the custody of the parent on the ground that the
judge has concluded that it is in the "best interests of the child" to
be in someone else's custody.3 4
Returning now to our consideration of the development of
constitutional protection of personal autonomy, we next consider
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 5 decided in 1942. The State of Oklahoma,
ostensibly in the misplaced belief that criminal tendencies were an
inheritable trait - or perhaps simply to sterilize the poor people
and racial minorities who had been convicted of committing "com-
mon crimes," - provided for the compulsory sterilization of persons
who had been convicted of and sentenced to imprisonment for
three felonies "involving moral turpitude." The law exempted
"white collar" crimes, such as embezzlement, political offenses, and
tax law violations, from the required sterilization. Skinner had
been convicted and imprisoned once for stealing chickens and
twice for robbery, and so was subject to the required sterilization.
In 1928, in the little-noticed case of Buck v. Bell, 6 the Court
had upheld against due process challenge a state law providing for
the compulsory sterilization of mentally retarded persons confined
in state institutions, so that they could be released to the outside
world without the ability to procreate. The Court held that the
legislature could accept the then current - and now completely dis-
credited - eugenics view that mental retardation was inheritable,
with Justice Holmes' famous aphorism, "[t]hree generations of
court could not constitutionally give custody of the child to the DeBoers. Once the Iowa
judge found that Dan Schmidt was the biological father and had not voluntarily terminated
parental rights, the Iowa judge was constitutionally compelled to deny the DeBoers' petition
for adoption, and since Schmidt had not yet had the opportunity to parent the child, the
judge could not find by clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent. Unfortu-
nately, the judge let the DeBoers retain physical custody of the child pending the comple-
tion of the appeal process. Once that process came to an end, the child had to be removed
from the custody of the DeBoers and returned to the custody of her father, regardless of
whether or not the judge thought that this was in the child's "best interests."
34. A recent case from Grand Rapids, Michigan, where the child had lived with an-
other family for a long time, the lawyer bringing the case on behalf of the child litigated it
effectively by concentrating on parental unfitness. Once the judge found parental unfitness,
the judge could at a minimum, remove the child from parental custody and then put the
child in the custody of the family with whom she had been living. But the judge also could
terminate parental rights, which would permit the child to be adopted by the family with
whom she had been living. Duong v. Hong, 478 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal
granted, Duong v. Hong, 479 N.W.2d 698 (Mich.), rev'd sub nom. Bowie v. Arder, 490
N.W.2d 568 (Mich. 1992).
35. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
36. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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imbeciles are enough." 7
Skinner's lawyer had to deal with the Buck v. Bell precedent,
and did so by launching a two-fold attack on the compulsory steril-
ization requirement. First, he argued that it violated due process
because scientific knowledge had now shown that criminal tenden-
cies were not inheritable. The same scientific knowledge had also
shown that mental retardation was not inheritable, which would
completely undercut the premises of Buck v. Bell. Second, he ar-
gued that the law violated equal protection because of the exemp-
tion for "white collar crime." Applying the principle that constitu-
tional cases should be decided on the narrowest possible ground,3 8
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, based the decision on the
equal protection argument. The classification between "white col-
lar crime" and other crimes, said Douglas, violated equal protec-
tion, because it "lays an unequal hand on those who have commit-
ted intrinsically the same quality of offense, and sterilizes one and
not the other," as illustrated by the distinction between embezzle-
ment and larceny.'
At this time, however, the Court was generally not disposed to
sustain equal protection challenges. And it had also completely
overturned the substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era
in the area of economic regulation. Douglas thus found it necessary
to justify a higher level of scrutiny for the equal protection chal-
lenge in the present case, which he did by saying that the compul-
sory sterilization requirement implicated the fundamental rights of
marriage and procreation (which at that time were assumed to go
together; only married persons were supposed to be procreating).
Douglas referred to marriage and procreation as involving "one of
the basic civil rights of man" and "fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the [human] race. ' 40 It was thus possible for
the Court, under this analysis, to protect Skinner from being steril-
ized without overruling Buck v. Bell, without reviving substantive
due process, and without calling into question the effect of its prior
decisions generally rejecting equal protection challenges to legisla-
tive classifications.
Regardless of what may have motivated the Skinner court to
decide the case the way it did and to promulgate the "fundamental
rights" doctrine of that case, Skinner stands as a very important
precedent in regard to constitutional protection of personal auton-
omy. Marriage is recognized as a fundamental right. Procreation is
37. Id. at 207.
38. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-73 (1947).
39. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
40. Id.
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also recognized as a fundamental right. And while the Court had
not yet specifically articulated a two-tier standard of review for
due process and equal protection challenges, Skinner clearly does
stand for the proposition that laws interfering with marriage and
procreation are subject to a higher degree of scrutiny than, let us
say, laws dealing with economic regulation.
There were no further developments in the area of constitu-
tional protection of personal autonomy until Griswold v. Connecti-
cut 41 came before the Court in 1965. This case involved a chal-
lenge to a nineteenth-century Connecticut law that prohibited the
use of contraceptives by all persons, including presumably by mar-
ried persons. In a test case of the law's constitutionality, a physi-
cian and the executive director of Connecticut Planned
Parenthood were prosecuted as accessories to a violation of the law
for giving medical advice about the use of contraceptives to a mar-
ried couple. The plaintiffs' lawyers in Griswold drew on Meyers,
Pierce, and Skinner in developing their constitutional challenge.
First, as the teachers and schools in Meyers and Pierce were
able to assert the constitutional rights of the parents, the physician
in Griswold was able to assert the rights of his patients, and the
executive director of Planned Parenthood the rights of her cli-
ents.42 Second, drawing on Meyers and Pierce, their primary con-.
stitutional challenge was based on substantive due process, more
particularly on the "right of privacy" that they argued was a part
of the "liberty" protected by substantive due process. Third, rely-
ing on Skinner, they argued that the ban on contraceptive use by
married persons interfered with the fundamental right of married
persons to engage in intimate marital relationships without risking
pregnancy - in essence that the right to procreate also included the
right to avoid procreation.
The Court held the ban unconstitutional as violating the mar-
ried couple's constitutional "right of privacy." However, only two
of the seven Justices comprising the majority, Harlan and White,
explicitly found this "right of privacy" to inhere in substantive due
process.4'3 The Court, it will be recalled, was coming off a "bad
trip" with substantive due process in the Lochner era, and the ma-
jority of the Justices were unwilling to revive substantive due pro-
cess in the area of personal autonomy while the Court was inter-
ring it completely in the area of economic regulation. Douglas,
writing the Court's opinion, found this "right of privacy" in the
"penumbras" of specific constitutional provisions that reflected
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Id. at 481.
43. Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502-06 (White, J., concurring).
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"privacy" values, such as the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments." Goldberg, Warren and Brennan found it in the
Ninth Amendment, 45 which had never before been invoked as a
limitation on governmental power. All agreed, however, that mar-
riage and what we would now call reproductive freedom were
within the "zone of privacy" protected by the newly found consti-
tutional "right of privacy," and all agreed that Connecticut's ban
on the use of contraceptives by married persons violated the con-
stitutional "right of privacy."
There has been much academic debate about Griswold and
the proper source of the constitutional "right of privacy."' "6 In Roe
v. Wade, 7 the Court simply said that the "right of privacy" was
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty," thereby in effect adopting the Harlan-White due process po-
sition in Griswold. Doctrinally then, Griswold is linked to Meyer
and Pierce, and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause is
indisputably the source of constitutional protection of personal
autonomy.
From the lawyer's standpoint, of course, the academic debate
about the proper source of the constitutional "right of privacy" at
the time of Griswold was completely irrelevant. Griswold had rec-
ognized a constitutional "right of privacy," and in the wake of
Griswold, lawyers could and did use this constitutional "right of
privacy" to challenge the constitutionality of the anti-abortion
laws that existed in virtually all of the states at this time. More
about this shortly.
In many ways, Griswold was more a case about marriage than
about reproductive freedom. In speaking of marriage, Justice
Douglas stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights....
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully en-
during, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associa-
tion that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions. 8
44. Id. at 484-85.
45. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Dem-
ocratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 43 (1976); Ira G. Lupu, supra, note 22
at 981; Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689 (1976); Richard Posner, The
Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 173 (1979).
47. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
48. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
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I now want to follow the marriage component of Griswold
through its application in subsequent cases. Because marriage is a
fundamental right, any restrictions or burdens on marriage are
subject to exacting scrutiny under the compelling governmental in-
terest standard of review. Thus, a ban on marriage between per-
sons of different races, while held in Loving v. Virginia"9 to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause as amount-
ing to invidious racial discrimination, was also held to violate
Fourteenth Amendment due process as an improper interference
with the freedom to marry. In the 1978 case of Zablocki v.
Redhail,50 the Court struck down on equal protection grounds (and
in the view of some Justices on due process grounds as well) a state
law prohibiting the remarriage of a divorced parent under a duty
of support to a child unless the parent could show that he was in
compliance with the existing court order, and that the child was
not likely to become a public charge. The restriction could not sat-
isfy the compelling governmental interest standard, both because
it imposed too heavy a burden on the right to marry, and because
it would not be effective in ensuring the support of the child. In
addition, there were less onerous means of enforcing the parent's
support obligations, such as wage assignment and civil and crimi-
nal sanctions against the parent. As Justice Stewart put it: "[I]n
regulating the intimate human relationship of marriage, there is a
limit beyond which a State may not constitutionally go."51 Because
marriage is a fundamental right, the lawyer for a prison inmate
was able to successfully challenge a prison regulation prohibiting
an inmate from marrying without the permission of the prison au-
thorities. It is irrelevant in this regard that the prison inmate and
the spouse may not be able to engage in sexual relations as long as
the inmate remains in confinement, since they can still enjoy the
other incidents of marriage.52 Likewise, since a person may be val-
idly married to only one'person at a time, the right to marry in-
cludes the right to divorce. Thus, a legal services lawyer was able
to obtain a holding from the Court that a state is constitutionally
required to permit an indigent person to bring a divorce proceed-
ing without having to pay court fees. 53
Going beyond marriage and parenting, the Court has held that
the right to family relationships includes the relationships of the
extended family. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,5 ' decided in
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
51. Id. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
53. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
54. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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1977, the Court was faced with a city zoning ordinance that had
defined "single family" in such a way as to preclude a grandmother
from sharing a household with her two grandchildren who were
cousins rather than siblings. The Court had previously upheld a
zoning law that prohibited more than two unrelated persons from
living in the same household. But this case involved family, and so
Mrs. Moore's lawyer was able to invoke the compelling governmen-
tal interest standard of review. The Court struck down the zoning
law. As Justice Powell, writing for the Court stated:
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition....
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the...
nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and espe-
cially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and chil-
dren [especially in times of adversity] has roots equally venerable
and equally deserving of constitutional recognition....
. T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standard-
izing its children - and its adults - by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns.5 5
We see then that the Constitution protects marriage and fam-
ily relationships as a fundamental right. People have a right to
marry, parents have a right to parent their children, and members
of the extended family have a right to live together. These rights
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause,
and the line of growth of constitutional protection of this element
of personal autonomy traces back to the Meyer and Pierce deci-
sions of the 1920's.
THE CONSTITUTION AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
We now turn to the reproductive freedom element of personal
autonomy. As we said earlier, Griswold armed lawyers with a con-
stitutional basis for challenging the anti-abortion laws that were in
effect in virtually all of the states at that time. If it had not been
for the Court's explicit recognition of a constitutional "right of pri-
vacy" in Griswold, such a constitutional basis for challenge simply
would not have existed at that time. These cases were filed in the
late 1960's, and in 1973, two of these cases reached the Supreme
Court. Roe v. Wade" involved a challenge to the strict anti-abor-
tion law in effect in Texas and thirty-five other states at that time,
which allowed an abortion only to save the life of the mother. Doe
55. Id. at 503-04, 506 (citations omitted).
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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v. Bolton57 involved a challenge to Georgia's "liberalized" abortion
law of the kind in effect in about a dozen states that allowed abor-
tion in some limited circumstances, such as where the pregnancy
threatened the woman's health, the fetus would likely be born with
a serious defect, or the pregnancy was the result of rape.
The year before the Court decided Roe and Doe, it had de-
cided another case, Eisenstadt v. Baird,58 which clearly separated
the right of reproductive freedom from the right of marriage. Fol-
lowing Griswold, Massachusetts amended its anti-contraception
law to allow married couples to have access to contraception when
prescribed by a physician. Baird, a non-physician and an advocate
of contraceptive use, was prosecuted for a violation of the law
when, during a speech about contraceptive use, he gave a can of
vaginal foam to an unmarried woman. Baird's lawyer argued suc-
cessfully that Baird, as an advocate for the use of contraception by
unmarried persons, could assert the reproductive freedom rights of
unmarried persons.59 The Court then held that, as a matter of
equal protection, unmarried persons must have the same access to
contraception as married persons, because a ban on contraception
interfered with their right to reproductive freedom. The Court em-
phasized that the "right of privacy," recognized in Griswold, was
an individual right, not a right of the married couple, and stated
that, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."6 The Court re-
jected the state's asserted justification that the law was a legiti-
mate means of deterring unmarried persons from having "illicit"
sex, saying that this was not the purpose of the law, but indicating
that if it was, it would be an impermissible means of advancing
that objective because of its interference with reproductive free-
dom.6 In effect, the Court held that the state could not constitu-
tionally "prescribe pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child
as punishment for fornication," which already was made a criminal
offense in Massachusetts. In other words, the state is constitution-
ally required to advance its interest in deterring "illicit sex" by
"less drastic means" - means that do not directly interfere with
reproductive freedom - such as by punishing persons for violation
of the criminal prohibition against "illicit sex."
As we will see, the Court subsequently has held that sexual
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
58. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
59. Id. at 445-46.
60. Id. at 453.
61. Id. at 447-50.
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freedom is not a fundamental right, and so has upheld the consti-
tutionality of state laws prohibiting unmarried persons from en-
gaging in sexual relations.2 It may seem anomalous that the state
can constitutionally prohibit unmarried persons from engaging in
sexual relations, but that it cannot constitutionally prohibit them
from using contraception while engaging in the illegal sexual rela-
tions. But in terms of the constitutional doctrine relating to the
protection of personal autonomy, this result is not anomalous.
Under this constitutional doctrine, reproductive freedom has the
status of a fundamental right, while sexual freedom does not, so
the "less drastic means" aspect of the compelling governmental in-
terest test renders the prohibition on contraception an impermissi-
ble means of advancing the state's otherwise valid interest in de-
terring "illicit sex."
Eisenstadt v. Baird then turns out to be a very important case
in the development of the line of growth of constitutional doctrine
applicable to the protection of reproductive freedom. As pointed
out above, it separates reproductive freedom from marriage, which
were linked together in Griswold as they were in Skinner. It also
makes it clear that all persons, married or unmarried, have the
same right to reproductive freedom. Finally, it makes it clear, as
the Court affirmed in Roe v. Wade, that reproductive freedom is a
fundamental right, so that any interference with reproductive free-
dom must be tested under the exacting compelling governmental
interest standard of review.
Let us now analyze Roe v. Wade and the companion case of
Doe v. Bolton from the perspective of the lawyers who were chal-
lenging and the lawyers who were defending the Texas and Georgia
anti-abortion laws. The argument for the lawyers challenging the
laws is obvious: reproductive freedom is a fundamental right -
Skinner, Griswold and now Eisenstadt - and, as regards to the re-
productive freedom of the pregnant woman, there is no logical dif-
ference between using contraception to prevent an unwanted preg-
nancy from occurring and having a medical abortion to undo an
unwanted pregnancy that has occurred because contraception was
not used or has failed. Thus, under the compelling governmental
interest standard of review, since both the Texas and Georgia laws
prevent a woman from exercising this fundamental right, they are
unconstitutional.
At first glance, the task of the lawyers defending the anti-
abortion laws may seem more difficult. They must justify the laws
under the exacting compelling governmental interest standard of
review, and they are faced with the precedents of Skinner, Gris-
62. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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wold, and Eisenstadt. But they can rise to the occasion. Their ar-
gument goes along these lines. Fundamental rights are not abso-
lute, and this interference with the fundamental right of
reproductive freedom can be justified under the compelling govern-
mental interest standard of review. In this case, unlike the situa-
tion in Skinner, Griswold, and Eisenstadt, where the particular in-
terference with reproductive freedom could not be shown to be
rationally related to the advancement of any legitimate govern-
mental interest, the prohibition against abortion does indeed ad-
vance a compelling governmental interest, the protection of poten-
tial human life. It does not matter that a fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the great
majority of cases, the pregnancy will not "spontaneously abort" -
what we call a miscarriage - and so will result in a live birth. Since
the state's interest in protecting potential human life from the mo-
ment of conception is a compelling interest, and since a prohibition
against abortion is the only effective way - and thus the "least
drastic means" of advancing that interest - the prohibition against
abortion can be sustained under the exacting compelling govern-
mental interest standard of review.
This is a doctrinally valid argument and could have been ac-
cepted by the Court in Roe and Doe. The Court could have distin-
guished Skinner, Griswold, and Eisenstadt on a constitutionally
principled basis, that is, on a basis that was consistent with the
line of growth of existing constitutional doctrine applicable to the
protection of reproductive freedom. And, staying within the ana-
lytical framework of the compelling governmental interest stan-
dard, the Court could have held that the state's interest in protect-
ing potential human life from the moment of conception was
"compelling," and that the ban on abortion was the "least drastic
means" of advancing that interest. The Court then, consistent with
existing constitutional doctrine, could have upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Texas and Georgia anti-abortion laws.
Instead, the Court, adopting a "stages of pregnancy" formula-
tion, held that the state's interest in protecting potential human
life did not become "compelling" until the stage of viability had
been reached, so that the state could not constitutionally prohibit
pre-viability abortions. After the stage of viability had been
reached, the state could prohibit abortion except where the abor-
tion was necessary to protect the life or health of the mother. 3
Since no post-viability abortion will be performed unless it is nec-
essary to protect the woman's life or health (ninety percent of the
abortions in this country are performed during the first ten weeks
63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-65 (1973).
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of pregnancy), the effect of Roe v. Wade was to make abortion
"available on demand."
In holding that the state's interest in protecting potential
human life was not "compelling" until the stage of viability had
been reached, the Court was obviously engaging in constitutional
balancing. It was making a value judgment about the relative con-
stitutional importance of the woman's interest in reproductive
freedom and the state's interest in protecting potential human life,
and it made that value judgment in favor of the woman's repro-
ductive freedom interest. This value judgment was obscured, per-
haps deliberately, by the Court's invocation and application of the
"stages of pregnancy" test. In writing the opinion for the Court,
Justice Blackmun does not attempt to provide any articulated jus-
tification for the constitutional balancing that took place and in
fact does not even acknowledge that the Court had engaged in
such balancing and had extended the precedents and line of
growth of constitutional doctrine applicable to the protection of re-
productive freedom. He tries to make it appear that the "stages of
pregnancy" formulation is the "analytically proper" method for
determining the "compelling" nature of the asserted governmental
interests to justify interference with the woman's right of repro-
ductive freedom, and that the result that the Court obviously
reached through constitutional balancing "logically followed" from
the application of that formulation. In this sense, Justice Black-
mun may be accused of doing a "judicial sleight of hand."
In the years following Roe, when Justice O'Connor came to the
Court, she launched a sweeping attack on the structural unsound-
ness of the "stages of pregnancy" formulation," and her views pre-
vailed in Casey.6 5 In that case, in a joint opinion authored by Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, and joined in by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens in order to keep intact what the joint opin-
ion called the "central holding" of Roe,6 the Court replaced the
"stages of pregnancy" formulation with an "undue burden" test.
Under the "undue burden" test, the "central holding" of Roe relat-
ing to the "prohibition of abortion" is reaffirmed: the state may
not prohibit abortions until the stage of viability has been
reached. 7 The other holding of Roe v. Wade that we have, not dis-
cussed - that the state may not regulate abortion at all during the
64. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-66 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (beginning the attack in her dissenting opinion), overruled in part
by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
65. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791.
66. Id. at 2838-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Id. at 2843-50
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 2810-17.
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first semester and thereafter may only regulate where this is
clearly necessary to protect maternal health - is in effect replaced
by the "undue burden" test. This means that "harassing-type" reg-
ulations that were unconstitutional under Roe and cases after Roe,
such as a twenty-four hour wait and "state required information"
designed to discourage the woman from having the abortion," are
now constitutionally permissible. It is only where the regulation
could actually prevent some women from having an abortion, such
as a requirement of consent by the husband of a married woman or
by the parents of a minor,69 or a requirement of notification to the
husband of a married woman,70 that it amounts to an "undue bur-
den," and so is unconstitutional.
The "regulation of abortion" cases that the Court decided be-
tween Roe and Casey are not central to our analysis of the consti-
tutional protection of personal autonomy from the lawyer's per-
spective, and so will not be discussed at length in this lecture.
However, I do want to say something about the lawyer's use of the
now-discarded "stages of pregnancy" test of Roe and the "no dis-
crimination against abortion" principle that also emerged from
Doe v. Bolton in the years following those cases. Precisely because
the Court had held that the state could not regulate abortion at all
prior to the end of the first semester and thereafter could regulate
the abortion procedure only to protect maternal health, any re-
strictions on abortion during the first trimester, and any restric-
tions on abortion that were not clearly related to the protection of
maternal health, such as a twenty-four hour wait, could success-
fully be challenged on constitutional grounds. The "no discrimina-
tion against abortion" principle that emerged from Doe v. Bolton,
also meant that any discrimination against abortion, such as the
refusal to perform abortions at a public hospital and the denial of
Medicaid funding for abortions for indigent women, could also be
successfully challenged on constitutional grounds, and were invali-
dated in a number of lower court cases.
In Maher v. Roe,7 however, decided in 1977, the Supreme
Court "pulled the rug" under these challenges, and reversing all
the lower court decisions that had relied on the "no discrimination
against abortion" principle of Doe v. Bolton, held that this princi-
ple did not apply when the state was acting as dispenser of benefits
68. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; Akron, 462 U.S. 416, overruled by Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791.
69. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976).
70. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-
31 (1992) (holding this requirement unconstitutional).
71. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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rather than as regulator. When the state was acting as dispenser of
benefits, said the Court, it was not interfering with the woman's
abortion decision, so the compelling governmental interest test did
not apply. Rather, the rational basis test applied, and although the
state did provide Medicaid funding for pregnancy-related cases, it
could decide to advance the interest in protecting potential human
life, and deny Medicaid funding for abortion. In effect, the Court
now made the value judgment that when the state was acting as
dispenser of benefits, the woman's interest in reproductive freedom
was not constitutionally more important than the state's interest
in advancing the protection of potential human life by subsidizing
only pregnancy. From the standpoint of the lawyer seeking to pro-
tect a woman's reproductive freedom by asserting constitutional
challenges to state laws that interfere with or burden that freedom,
the decision is unfortunate. But since that lawyer must rely on the
courts to protect reproductive freedom when the "political battle"
has been lost in the legislature, after Maher v. Roe the lawyer can
only say: "The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. Blessed be
the name of the Lord."
The lawyer, however, still has another weapon at his or her
disposal - the state constitution. All of the state constitutions have
bill of rights provisions protecting individual rights against govern-
mental actions, parallelling the guarantees of the federal Constitu-
tion, and sometimes going even further, such as a specific right of
privacy guarantee. The state courts can, of course, interpret the
guarantees of the state constitution more expansively than the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the parallel guaran-
tees of the federal Constitution.7 2 Following Maher v. Roe, chal-
lenges were brought to bans on Medicaid funding for abortion in
some states under the state constitution, and some of these chal-
lenges were successful.7 3 Unfortunately, from the standpoint of re-
productive freedom and equality for indigent women in Michigan,
the challenge to Michigan's ban on Medicaid funding for abortion
was not.7
4
I now want to come back to the Roe v. Wade decision itself.
The decision was a surprise, even to the most ardent advocate of a
woman's right to reproductive freedom, because of its sweeping na-
ture. The decision was inconsistent with the principle that a con-
72. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental
Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL. L. REv. 465 (1985).
73. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal.
1981); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Moe v. Secretary of Administra-
tion & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J.
1982).
74. Doe v. Department of Social Serv., 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992).
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stitutional decision should not be rendered "in broader terms than
are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be ap-
plied. ' 75 The lawyers who were asserting the constitutional chal-
lenges to state anti-abortion laws were only concerned about strik-
ing down the draconian Texas law in Roe that prohibited all
abortions except where necessary to preserve the woman's life, and
the still highly restrictive Georgia law in Doe that allowed abortion
only in limited circumstances. And the focus of the challenge was
on abortion prohibition rather than on abortion regulation. All
that the Court had to decide in Roe and Doe was that these kinds
of laws constituted an improper interference with a woman's fun-
damental right of reproductive freedom. Instead, the Court came
down with a sweeping decision, invalidating all the anti-abortion
laws then in existence, as well as any other law that would prohibit
a woman from having a pre-viability abortion, and imposing signif-
icant constitutional restrictions on a state's efforts to regulate the
abortion procedure. It was a complete and unexpected victory for
advocates of reproductive freedom.7
It was this feature of the Roe v. Wade decision that Supreme
Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg - who at the time of Roe was
the head of the ACLU's Women's Rights Project and who, through
her writing and litigation of major Supreme Court cases, was de-
veloping the constitutional protection of gender equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause - has called into
question. Justice Ginsburg has criticized Roe v. Wade first for the
sweeping nature of the decision, which went beyond invalidating
the Texas and Georgia anti-abortion laws that were at issue in that
case, and for "fashion[ing] a regime ... a set of rules that dis-
placed virtually every state law then in force."' 7 Secondly, she crit-
icized the decision for not focusing sufficiently on the impact that
anti-abortion laws had on the "'ability [of a woman] to control
[her] [own destiny] ...' and her 'ability... to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the Nation,' ", 78 a focus that she
found in the Casey decision. She notes that, "[t]he idea of the wo-
man in control of her destiny and her place in society was less
prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled with the rights
of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her physician's medical
75. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947).
76. See Robert A. Sedler, The Legal Dimensions of Women's Liberation: An Over-
view, 47 IND. L.J. 419, 427-30 (1972) (discussing the constitutional challenges to anti-abor-
tion laws shortly before Roe was decided).
77. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199
(1992).
78. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992)).
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judgment.""8 Justice Ginsburg concludes that: "The Roe decision
might have been less of a storm center had it both honed in more
precisely on the women's equality dimension of the issue and, cor-
respondingly, attempted nothing more bold at that time than the
mode of decisionmaking the Court employed in the 1970s gender
classification cases."80 In those cases, a number of which, as we
said, were litigated by Justice Ginsburg herself, the Court pro-
ceeded on a case by case basis, invalidating all of the traditional
gender-based classifications that had disadvantaged women, and
invalidating gender-based classifications disadvantaging men, ex-
cept where the classification could be shown to be substantially re-
lated to overcoming the present consequences of past discrimina-
tion against women as a group."1
I want to relate Justice Ginsburg's concern about the absence
of "the idea of the woman in control of her destiny and her place
in society" in the Roe decision to the lawyering perspective that we
have attempted to bring to that decision and to the development
of the constitutional protection of personal autonomy. There is no
doubt that Roe was litigated entirely as a case about reproductive
freedom. It was not litigated at all as a case about equality and
women's rights. The right of a woman, here a woman's right to
reproductive freedom, was involved in Roe only because of the bio-
logical fact that only women get pregnant and so are in need of a
safe and legal abortion in order to terminate an unwanted preg-
nancy. But the doctrinal basis of the challenge to anti-abortion
laws in Roe was the interference with the woman's right to repro-
ductive freedom, and the precedents supporting that challenge
were the reproductive freedom precedents of Skinner, Griswold,
and Eisenstadt, precedents that involved the reproductive freedom
of both men and women. Thus, the fact that anti-abortion laws
impacted only on women and so "interfered with [her] ability to
control her own destiny and to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation" was logically and doctrinally irrele-
vant to the basis of the constitutional challenge in Roe. The consti-
tutional right of reproductive freedom is, in the true sense of the
term, an aspect of personal autonomy, the autonomy of persons,
both men and women, to "control their reproductive destiny." It
protects the right of both men and women to use contraception in
order to prevent an unwanted pregnancy (unwanted, we will as-
sume, by the man as well as by the woman), to avoid being subject
79. Id. at 1199-1200 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 1200.
81. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 733-51 (4th ed.
1991) (analyzing and discussing these cases).
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to compulsory sterilization, and equally to voluntarily choose to be
sterilized free from governmental interference. And since only
women can get pregnant, it protects the right of a pregnant woman
to have a safe and legal abortion, and likewise her right not to be
compelled to have an abortion. 2
As we have said, it was only the Griswold decision recognizing
a "constitutional right of privacy" that made it doctrinally possible'
to assert a constitutional challenge to state anti-abortion laws in
the late 1960's. It would not have been doctrinally possible at that
time - at least without establishing new constitutional doctrine in
the process - to challenge those laws as constituting impermissible
sex discrimination against women (which I believe them to be),"3
because constitutional protection of gender equality had not yet
been recognized by the Supreme Court. It was not until Reed v.
Reed, 4 decided in 1971, that the Court first held that the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection clause reached gender dis-
crimination and could be used as the doctrinal basis for challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the widespread use of gender-based
classifications in American law.
But in my view, even if it would have been doctrinally possible
to challenge anti-abortion laws at that time on the basis of gender
discrimination, this would not be as effective a basis of challenge
as a challenge based on the interference with reproductive free-
dom. Again, this is because constitutional protection of reproduc-
tive freedom as an element of constitutional protection of personal
autonomy had already been established by prior decisions such as
82. Thus, just as the state cannot give parents the right to prevent their minor daugh-
ter from having an abortion, the state cannot give parents the right to compel their minor
daughter to have an abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
The government's effort to compel a woman to have an abortion against her will was at
issue in Struck v. Secretary of Defense. 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 409
U.S. 942, vacated, 409 U.S. 947 (1972). Captain Struck was an Air Force career officer who
became pregnant in Vietnam. Her religious views precluded her from having an abortion.
She declared her intention to place her child for adoption immediately after birth, and did
so. At the time Air Force regulations required the discharge of any woman officer who be-
came pregnant. Captain Struck's constitutional challenge was rejected by the lower courts,
but after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Air Force backed off and permitted her
to remain in the service. Justice Ginsburg notes that while Captain Struck asserted a per-
sonal autonomy challenge, her primary challenge was based on "Fifth Amendment equal
protection," focusing on the discrimination between male officers who became fathers and
female officers who became mothers, and between female officers who chose to have an abor-
tion and female officers who chose to continue their pregnancy. See Ginsburg, supra note
77, at 1200-02. I would suggest that if Captain Struck's case arose after Roe v. Wade had
been decided, her challenge likely would have been based entirely on the interference with
her reproductive freedom and clearly would have been successful.
83. See Sedler, supra note 76, at 425-30. "[Aintiabortion laws or laws that limit the
availability of any contraceptive measure constitute an acute form of discrimination against
women." Id. at 426 (footnote omitted).
84. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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Skinner and Griswold, and by the time Roe came to the Supreme
Court, by Eisenstadt. A challenge based on the interference with
reproductive freedom thus would have firmer doctrinal and prece-
dential support than a challenge based on gender equality, which
would have required the Court to hold that discrimination against
pregnant women, such as a prohibition on abortion, amounted to
impermissible gender discrimination. To put it another way, from
the standpoint of the litigating lawyer, it would be easier to analo-
gize a prohibition against abortion to the prohibition against con-
traceptive use that was held unconstitutional in Griswold and Ei-
senstadt, than it would to the prohibitions against gender-based
classifications, such as the law in Reed preferring men over women
in the appointment of administrators of estates, that were held un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court in the early 1970's.
And in fact, the Supreme Court has specifically held that dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy does not constitute discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex for constitutional purposes. In upholding
a state's exclusion of disabilities connected with normal pregnancy
and childbirth from its disability scheme for state employees, the
Court took the position that the law did not distinguish between
men and women, but between pregnant persons, all of whom were
women, and non-pregnant persons, who included men and
women. 5 By the same token, an anti-abortion law could be said to
distinguish not between men and women, but between pregnant
persons seeking an abortion, all of whom were women, and non-
pregnant persons, men and women, who would have no need for an
abortion. However, when the state has imposed a burden on a wo-
man because she has chosen to exercise her right of reproductive
freedom, as when a school board required pregnant teachers to
take unpaid maternity leave after the fourth month of pregnancy,
this interference with the teacher's right of reproductive freedom
was held to be violative of due process.8 6 Nor can a state constitu-
tionally deny unemployment compensation to a woman when she
becomes unemployed during her pregnancy. 7
My point then is that the lawyers challenging the constitution-
ality of state anti-abortion laws in the late 1960's should properly
have based the challenge on the interference with reproductive
freedom, even if it had been doctrinally possible at that time to
85. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Following this decision, the Court also held
that employment discrimination on the basis of a woman's pregnancy did not constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. In order to reach pregnancy discrimination, it was necessary for Congress to enact the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 1981).
86. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
87. Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
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challenge those laws as constituting impermissible gender discrimi-
nation. Again, the constitutional right of reproductive freedom is a
right of both men and women, and in the context of anti-abortion
laws, it protects the right of a pregnant woman to obtain a safe and
legal abortion.
SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE "RIGHT TO DIE"
Leaving reproductive freedom, we will now discuss two more
aspects of constitutional protection of personal autonomy, sexual
freedom, and a so-called "right to die." In Bowers v. Hardwick,",
decided in 1986, the Court held that sexual freedom is not a funda-
mental right, and so applied a rational basis standard to uphold a
state law prohibiting homosexual sodomy. The rationale of that
decision, which was that the state could prohibit homosexual sod-
omy because the state considered it to be "immoral and unaccept-
able," would extend to state laws prohibiting sexual relationships
between unmarried heterosexual persons, which the state could
also consider to be "immoral and unacceptable." For this reason, I
want to analyze this case from the perspective of lawyers litigating
a constitutional challenge to a hypothetical state law prohibiting
any sexual relationships between unmarried persons, homosexual
or heterosexual.
The crucial question in this case would be whether the Court
would hold that sexual freedom is a fundamental right, so that any
interference with sexual freedom must be evaluated under the ex-
acting compelling governmental interest standard of review. If sex-
ual freedom is not treated as a fundamental right, then the ra-
tional basis standard of review applies, and the law can be
sustained as prohibiting "immoral and unacceptable" conduct. As
we have said, in deciding whether or not a particular aspect of per-
sonal autonomy rises to the level of a fundamental right, the
Court, whether it admits it or not, is making a value judgment
about the relative importance of the individual interest in relation
to the interests that the state can assert to justify interference with
that interest.
The lawyer for the unmarried persons would rely on the per-
sonal autonomy value reflected in the marriage and reproductive
freedom cases. The lawyer would argue, as did the dissent in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, that sexual intimacy is "'a sensitive, key relation-
ship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality,'" and "that individu-
als define themselves ... through their intimate [ ] relationships
88. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
[Vol. 11:771
19941 CONSTITUTION AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY 797
with others."89 While some people may choose to define themselves
through intimate relationships within the framework of marriage,
others choose to define themselves through relationships outside of
marriage, either with persons of the opposite sex, when the parties
do not wish to marry, or with persons of the same sex, when the
parties cannot legally marry. For these reasons, sexual freedom
should be treated as a fundamental right, and a ban on all sexual
relationships outside of marriage cannot be justified under the ex-
acting compelling governmental interest standard of review.
The more interesting argument, I think, is the argument that
should be made by the lawyer for the state, seeking to uphold the
law. That argument, in my opinion, should rely on the cases hold-
ing that marriage is a fundamental right, and should develop the
thesis that the state cannot recognize sexual freedom as a funda-
mental right, because to do so would undercut marriage as a fun-
damental right, or more specifically, the state's interest in main-
taining and preserving marriage as the basic relational interest in
American society. In other words, the lawyer for the state would be
turning the other side's argument against itself, so to speak, by re-
lying on the importance of marriage, as reflected in the Court's de-
cisions declaring marriage to be a fundamental right, in order to
justify the restrictions on sexual activity outside of marriage. Far
from supporting the constitutional challenge then, the argument
would be that these decisions actually operate to support the con-
stitutionality of the challenged law.
The lawyer for the state would quote the language from these
decisions recognizing the importance of marriage in American soci-
ety, such as Justice Powell's observation in Moore that "the insti-
tution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition,"90 and Justice Douglas' ringing statement in Griswold
that marriage is "an institution which the State not only must al-
low, but which always and in every age, it has fostered and pro-
tected." '91 The argument would continue along the lines that the
importance of the fundamental right of marriage, as reflected in
these decisions, has an obverse side and can be relied on to pro-
hibit sexual relationships outside of marriage. Whenever the state
acts to preserve the integrity of marriage as the basic relational
institution in society, and the only legally recognized basis for a
sexual relationship, it is advancing an interest of the "highest mag-
nitude." The prohibition against all sexual activity outside of mar-
89. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Salton, 413
U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
90. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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riage serves to legitimatize marriage as the basic relational institu-
tion and the only legally recognized basis for a sexual relationship.
The prohibition also serves to induce heterosexual people at least
to enter into the marriage relationship. Sexual activity outside of
marriage then weakens the legitimacy of marriage and may dis-
courage people from marrying.
The lawyer for the state would conclude the argument along
these lines. Because of the importance of the state's interest in
maintaining marriage as the basic relational institution and the
only legally recognized basis for a sexual relationship, the individ-
ual's interest in sexual freedom is correspondingly reduced. Sexual
freedom cannot be recognized as an important individual interest,
because to do so would undercut the importance of marriage as the
basic relational interest in society; sexual freedom is inconsistent
with marriage, since sexual intimacy is such an integral part of
marriage. In effect, the lawyer for the state is asking the Court to
make the value judgment that the individual's interest in sexual
freedom is not constitutionally more important than the state's in-
terest in maintaining marriage as the basic relational institution
and the only legally recognized basis for a sexual relationship.
This is the value judgment that the Court in effect made in
Bowers v. Hardwick, when it held that sexual freedom is not a fun-
damental right. And since sexual freedom is not a fundamental
right, prohibitions on sexual relationships outside of marriage, het-
erosexual as well as homosexual, can be sustained against constitu-
tional challenge. The constitutional protection of personal auton-
omy thus does not extend to personal autonomy in sexual
relationships.
Finally, we will consider the so-called "right to die" in the
context of the current ACLU challenge to Michigan's ban against
"assisted suicide" in Hobbins v. Attorney-General."2 And again, we
will do so from the lawyer's perspective, here, however, my own
perspective in helping to formulate the basis of the ACLU consti-
tutional challenge in this case.
First the facts. As might be expected, the nationwide contro-
92. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., No. 164963 (filed but not decided).
[Since the time of the speech, this case has been decided by the court of appeals. See
518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App.), stay denied sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, 519 N.W.2d
890 (Mich.), amended, 519 N.W.2d 898 (Mich.), appeal granted, 521 N.W.2d 4 (Mich. 1994).
Ed.]
In a 2-1 decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the enactment of the law
violated Article 4, section 24 of the Michigan Constitution. However, lining up differently,
the court also held 2-1, that the law did not violate substantive due process. The Michigan
Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on both issues. The case was argued before that
Court on October 4, 1994, and at that time this article went to press, the case is awaiting
decision.
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versy over the legitimacy and legality of assisted suicide has had
its most immediate impact in Michigan, the home of assisted sui-
cide's most visible practitioner, Dr. Jack Kevorkian. In the 1992-93
session of the Michigan legislature, a number of bills dealing with
assisted suicide were introduced, ranging from permitting assisted
suicide in certain circumstances to completely prohibiting it in all
circumstances. Faced with this politically-charged and highly con-
troversial issue, the Michigan legislature decided to do what legis-
latures -often do in such a situation - appoint a blue ribbon com-
mission to study the matter. However, the day before the agreed-
upon bill establishing the study commission was to be voted upon
in the Michigan House, Kevorkian performed another of his now
familiar assisted suicides, which as usual, received nationwide me-
dia coverage. This renewed the legislative clamor to "Stop Kevor-
kian," and "not let Michigan become the Nation's suicide capital."
The study commission bill was then amended on the floor of the
House to add a provision making assisted suicide a criminal of-
fense. The amended bill was quickly passed by the House and the
Senate and signed into law by the Governor."3
The enactment of the bill in this precipitous way and the com-
bination in one bill of a provision setting up a commission to study.
assisted suicide along with a provision making assisted suicide a
criminal offense, we argued, clearly violate Article 4, section 24 of
the Michigan Constitution, which prohibits the same bill from con-
taining more than one "object" and which prohibits a "change of
purpose" of proposed legislation during its legislative journey
through both houses. In order to assert this state constitutional
law claim, it was necessary to bring our suit in the state courts.
The trial judge in Wayne Circuit Court held the law unconstitu-
tional on this basis,"4 and I am optimistic that her decision will be
upheld by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Again, from the lawyer's
perspective, this is the most effective ground of constitutional chal-
lenge, both because it is very narrow, and because it is well-sup-
ported by existing precedents dealing with "title-object" and
"change of purpose." Again, the lawyer's objective is to strike the
law down on whatever ground possible. This objective is as well
93. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REPORT, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 20 (discussing the events leading up to the enact-
ment of the law).
94. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., No. 93-306-178 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed May 24,
1993). See supra note 92.
[Since the time of the speech, this case has been decided by the court of appeals. See
518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App.), stay denied sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, 519 N.W.2d
890 (Mich.), amended, 519 N.W.2d 898 (Mich.), appeal granted, 521 N.W.2d 4 (Mich. 1994).
Ed.]
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served if the law is struck down on what the media call "technical
grounds" as it is if it is struck down on substantive constitutional
grounds. There is then simply no law interfering with "assisted sui-
cide." The matter goes back to the legislature, and this time, as we
say, "the voice of the people will be heard." Perhaps, since public
opinion polls show strong support for assisted suicide at least in
some circumstances, and for that matter, for Dr. Kevorkian him-
self, the legislature may not be able to enact any law. If it does
manage to enact a law, then most surely it will not be as draconian
as the present law that we are challenging. In any event, it will be
time enough to mount a substantive constitutional challenge when
and if a new law is enacted by the legislature.
Of course, we also asserted a substantive constitutional chal-
lenge, which I will now discuss. In this case, the nature of the con-
stitutional challenge was directly related to the people who were
asserting the challenge. The ACLU did not bring the constitutional
challenge on behalf of Dr. Kevorkian or on behalf of proponents of
voluntary euthanasia or on behalf of non-terminally ill persons
who wish to terminate an "unbearable existence." The principal
plaintiffs in the case are terminally ill cancer patients who want to
have the choice to hasten their inevitable death by taking a lethal
dose of physician-prescribed medications, and by physicians who
want to prescribe such medications so that their patients will be
able to have this choice. The sweeping ban on assisted suicide that
is contained in Michigan's law prohibits physicians from prescrib-
ing lethal medications for this purpose, and makes them subject to
criminal prosecution for doing so.5
It is clear then that we are not asserting a constitutional "right
to die" or even a constitutional right to receive assistance in com-
mitting suicide. Our constitutional challenge is quite narrow. We
are relying, of course, on the constitutional protection of personal
autonomy. Structurally, we are asserting that the "liberty" pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause em-
braces the right of a terminally ill person to hasten inevitable
death, and that the ban on the use of physician-prescribed medica-
tions for this purpose that is contained in the Michigan law is un-
constitutional because it imposes an "undue burden" on this right.
In formulating our substantive constitutional challenge, of
course, we had to look to existing Supreme Court doctrine and pre-
cedent, and the principal case on which we are relying is Casey.8
First, the Court in Casey gave a broad definition of the meaning of
personal autonomy, quite similar to the definition given some sev-
95. See Sedler, supra note 93, at 21-22.
96. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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enty years ago by Justice McReynolds in Meyer.9 7 The Casey
Court stated:
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter....
... It is settled now . . . that the Constitution places limits on a
State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about
family and parenthood, as well as bodily integrity....
•.. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own con-
cept of existence, of [the] meaning of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life.. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of
the State.9s
We rely on this language in Casey to support our contention that
the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due pro-
cess clause embraces the right of a terminally ill person to hasten
inevitable death. We also rely on other Supreme Court decisions,
such as the so-called "right to die" case, Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health,9 9 holding that a person's entitlement
to bodily integrity and control over one's own body protects a per-
son's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, including the
right of a competent adult to make the personal decision to discon-
tinue lifesaving medical treatment. Finally, we rely on Roe v. Wade
and Casey themselves and the predecessor cases of Griswold and
Eisenstadt. In this vein, we argue that for the same reasons as peo-
ple have a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment even if this
results in their death, a right to have an abortion, and a right to
use contraception, a terminally ill person's right to control over
that person's own body must include the right to make the deci-
sion to hasten inevitable death. 100
Second, we argue that the undue burden formulation of
Casey1 ' is the proper standard under which to evaluate the consti-
tutionality of Michigan's ban on assisted suicide, as it is the proper
standard under which to evaluate the constitutionality of a restric-
tion on abortion. And paraphrasing language in Casey, we argue
97. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
98. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-07 (citations omitted).
99. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
100. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 19-23, Hobbins v. Attorney
Gen., (No. 16493). See Sedler, supra, note 93 at 23-24 (summarizing these constitutional
arguments); Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on "Assisted Suicide:"
The View from Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1994) (developing these
arguments more fully).
101. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
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that, "To say the least, a ban on the use of physician-prescribed
medications, obviously places a substantial obstacle in the path of
a terminally ill person seeking to hasten that person's inevitable
death." As we conclude: Indeed "[a] more extreme undue burden
on the exercise of that right cannot be imagined, and for this rea-
son the ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications is
unconstitutional. '" 10
2
The narrowness of our constitutional challenge, limiting it to
the ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications by termi-
nally ill persons to hasten inevitable death, makes the state's task
of justifying the ban all the more difficult. The state has tried to
justify the ban as being necessary to "preserve life," or as Professor
Yale Kamisar, a strong opponent of what he calls "assisted sui-
cide," has put it, in preventing the disregard for life that he sees
resulting from a "suicide permissive society." 103 To which our reply
is simply, "But there can be no valid interest in 'preserving life'
when there is no 'life left to preserve.' " Thus, we argue that: A ban
on the use of physician-prescribed medications by a terminally ill
person to hasten inevitable death does not advance any conceiva-
ble interest in 'preserving life.' "Quite to the contrary, it does
nothing more than force a terminally ill person to undergo contin-
ued unbearable ... suffering" until death mercifully intervenes.10 4
If and when a court is ever called upon to resolve this substantive
constitutional challenge, the effectiveness of our argument will re-
ceive its crucial empirical test - will it be accepted by the court,
and will we prevail.
CONCLUSION
It is on this point that we may appropriately end this lecture.
As in other areas of law, in constitutional litigation, it is the lawyer
who performs the crucial role of formulating the issues and of de-
veloping the constitutional arguments that are the basis of chal-
lenge and defense. I hope that I have succeeded in persuading you
of the vital role that the lawyer plays in constitutional litigation
and that perhaps you may have gained some insights about the
lawyer's role in the development of the constitutional protection of
personal autonomy.
102. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 23-24, Hobbins (No. 164963).
103. Yale Kamisar, Are Laws against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., May-June 1993 at 32, 37.
104. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 28, Hobbins (No. 164963).
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